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RELIGIOUS EXPLANATIONS: A MODEL FROM
THE SCIENCES BY EDWARD L. SCHOEN
Eman McMullin
The author of a forthright recent book' tells us that he is engaged "in the struggle
to show not only that religious truth claims can be patterned along strictly
scientific lines, but also that such claims are capable of meeting rigorously
scientific standards for theoretical adequacy" (p. viii). Edward Schoen's aim is
the "cognitive rehabilitation of religious discourse" in the face of modem skeptical
attack (p. ix). The "cognitive integrity" of religion is to be secured by showing
that religious discourse "may be used successfully to provide explanations strictly
parallel with those offered in the sciences" (p. 23). This, he insists over and
over, is what is required to "salvage effectively the cognitive respectability of
religious discourse" (p. 127).
Schoen is well aware that he travels a lonely road. Even those "religious
theorists" (his label for the audience he is addressing) who are most sympathetic
to analogies between science and religion, he suggests, always suffer in the end
from failure of nerve. He chides Basil Mitchell, Fred Ferre and Ian Ramsey, for
example, because they are "convinced that any attempt to provide religious
explanations of a rigorously scientific type must be abandoned as a hopelessly
impossible task" (p. 79). It is just this task that he considers essential; religion
must be shown "capable of the same kinds of explanations as can be offered by
the sciences," if it is to survive the potent challenge of critics like Huxley, Freud
or Kai Nielsen (p. 22).
Ian Barbour is the author who comes closest to drawing the desired parallel
between the modes of explanation in religion and science (p. 25). But Schoen
argues that the notion of metaphor to which Barbour constantly returns is too
weak. It leads Barbour to deny that theories and their associated models can be
a "literal picture of the world" (p. 27). Whereas for Schoen, (partially) literal
pictures are just what successful theories are. Though theory relies on analogy,
the analogy can function properly only if it rests ultimately on univocal predication
of at least some features. Still, Schoen affirms that his "general strategy for
rehabilitating the cognitive integrity of religious discourse" will be exactly the
same as Barbour's (p. 34), except that vague notions like metaphor and symbolic
construct will be avoided because they permit the desired parallel between
religious and scientific explanation to become too hazy.
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It may at this point be worth recalling the inspiration from which positivism
originally came. A "positivist" was one who saw "positive" science as the
touchstone of genuine knowledge; the cognitive integrity of any form of discourse
could be established only by showing that it conformed to the norms proper to
empirical science. Schoen finds traces of logical positivism in the writers he
criticizes; their account of science is too verificationist or too traditionally empiricist to pass muster in these Quinean days. He takes Kuhn and Laudan as his
own guides to the "post-positivist" philosophy of science he espouses. Yet at a
deeper level, his own approach to philosophy of religion is the classical positivist
one. Of course, the original positivists thought that their epistemic restriction
was sufficient to disqualify religion, at least religion of the traditional sort.
Schoen is sure that he can accept the positivist ideals of cognitive respectability
and still salvage belief in the Christian God. We shall see.
First, what does Schoen mean by a "religious explanation"? It is an explanation
of a pattern of observable events by an appeal to God as cause. The sorts of
explanation in which he is interested are always of observable phenomena, and
not just of singular events but of patterns of regularities. It is not altogether clear
why he insists on this last restriction since many parts of natural science purport
to explain historical singulars (in the geological sequence, for example). But the
effect of this, as he realizes, is to rule out miracles of the Gospel kind as
candidates for acceptable "religious explanations" (p. 114).
Though a "theologian" called Fred makes his appearance in chapter 4, it is
worth noting that Schoen is not attempting to' validate theological discourse in
the broader sense. Fred is concerned to explain significant patterns he has noticed
in his own life, specifically the fact that help always seems to be on hand when
needed, by way of an unexpected check in the mail, for example (p. 84). He is
not dealing with the intricacies of the Biblical text, with the doctrines of Incarnation, Redemption, Trinity, or the like. One wonders how these latter are to
be validated, if one insists on the positivist norm. But perhaps Schoen believes
that if once the existence of God can be supported in an appropriately scientific
way, these other doctrines can then be accepted on God's authority. Still, this
does seem problematic, given the epistemic standpoint he adopts:

If the modem skeptic's deep conviction about the paradigmatic nature
of the scientific enterprise is to be respected, it is necessary to show
that the ways in which religious claims fulfill full-blooded cognitive
roles are able to parallel precisely the theoretical structures employed
in the hardest of the sciences (p. 21).

Of course, one might ask whether the skeptic's deep conviction ought not rather
be resisted than respected. Or one might perhaps try to construe Schoen's entire
strategy as an ad hominem device. But if it is indeed necessary, as he claims,
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to find parallels in science to warrant religious claims as cognitive, most of
Christian theology is left in a precarious position. Postulating a God to explain
significant patterns of happenings in believers' lives will not get one very far
into that larger enterprise where apparently cognitive claims are made about such
things as the atoning role of the death of Jesus of Nazareth.
Though Schoen never mentions Aristotle, the explanation of motion in terms
of a First Mover with which the Physics culminates would be a paradigm instance
of a "religious explanation" in his sense. And the natural theology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ought, on the face of it, be another major source.
Schoen is, however, at some pains to distinguish between the design proofs that
were the main concern of natural theology and the design explanations he himself
proposes (p. 155). The former, he thinks, may be vulnerable to Hume's objections; the latter are not, because the "plausibility constraints" appropriate to
explanations, he ventures, are weaker than those proper to proofs. Explanations
are proposed for limited ranges of phenomena only, laying aside other ranges.
"All that is required of a plausible explanation is that it explain the range it is
expected to explain." So while the existence of evil on earth or of disorder
elsewhere in the universe "might weaken seriously the force of any attempt to
prove the existence of a divine designer, it is of no relevance whatever when it
comes to matters of divine explanation" (p. 155).
But this simply will not do. Schoen elsewhere notices the bond between
explanation and truth: an explanatory entity can explain only if it exists (p. 83).
Thus an explanation serves to warrant the existence of the entities it postulates
precisely to the extent that it is a good explanation. Schoen does not want to
commit himself to design proofs because he knows that the skeptics he is out
to impress will not accept them. But if they will not admit their plausibility as
proofs, they will not accept his explanations as good explanations either. And
if they do not, he has not, so far as I can see, established the cognitive integrity
of religious discourse in their eyes either.
Schoen appears to think that it is sufficient for him to show only the "initial
plausibility" of his religious explanations (p. 157). And for this it only matters
whether the proffered explanation does suffice to explain the data to be explained,
no matter if it would fail were it to be extended to other data. "Since explanatory
ranges may be gerrymandered unmercifully, the believer need exercise only a
modicum of caution to avoid including inappropriate patterns of data in God's
explanatory range" (p. 161). Note that by 'inappropriate,' Schoen means patterns
that are known (or suspected) not to fit, such as the prevalence of suffering,
with respect to explanations involving a loving God. It is indeed "not at all
difficult," he says, to invoke God in order to explain biological design as long
as one simply ignores the awkward contexts where design appears to be absent.
"By the simple expedient of pushing problematic patterns outside God's
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explanatory scope, the religious believer can avoid the embarrassment of having
to admit that God is responsible for the darker side of biology" (pp. 160-01).
But this is not how the plausibility, even the initial plausibility, of an explanation is estimated. It would be abstractly possible to explain a limited range of
phenomena in isolation from all other potentially relevant considerations. But
to call an explanation "plausible" is to imply that no such deliberate restriction
of scope ("gerrymandering") to exclude potential anomalies has occurred. In his
discussion of the criteria governing the plausibility of scientific explanations (pp.
76-78), Schoen himself later lists as his first criterion of plausibility the scope
of the explanation offered; an explanation that accounts for a broader range is
to be preferred (p. 130). It would seem, then, that an explanation that appears
from the beginning not to account for some range of known facts has a mark
against it. Explanations are never introduced for entirely isolated ranges of data,
as though one could leave aside related contexts in assessing initial plausibility.
This is crucially important to the effectiveness of Schoen's overall argument.
If he is trying to convince the skeptic that religious believers can produce explanations that conform to scientific standards, it will not be enough to bring forward
possible explanations. It will not suffice to say of biological design that God
could have brought this about in a miraculous way. The skeptic already knows
this, but is totally unimpressed. What would be needed would be to show that
it is a good explanation, perhaps even the best explanation, and this is what the
skeptic will not concede. The fact (if it is a fact) that the believer uses explanations
of a broadly scientific kind is of itself no help in this debate, unless these
explanations are also good ones. Schoen himself seems to see this in his chapter
6, but then much of the argument in the earlier part of the book drops away.
If it is clearly seen that what is required for Schoen's strategy to work is the
availability of good "religious explanations," the distinction he draws between
proof and explanation disappears. In the context of theory, good explanation
constitutes proof, and proof can come only through explanation judged to be
good. The proof in question is, of course, not definitive but it is the best available
in the context of non-deductive argument of the theoretical kind. Schoen's choice
of explanation as the context in which religion is to be validated as a genuine
form of knowledge is bound to appear strange to readers who are accustomed
to a focus in philosophy of religion on questions of justification or on broader
issues of rationality of argument. Perhaps enough has been said to show why
his choice does not in the end allow him to evade these more familiar questions.
Schoen wants to model his religious explanations on a specific, indeed a very
restricted, type of scientific explanation. He supplies an imaginary example of
a scientist who wishes to explain the expansion and contraction of balloons at
different altitudes, and who searches for a "relevantly analogous" pattern of
phenomena whose "governing mechanism" is already known (p. 63). He finds
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this in the behavior of rubber balls immersed in the Pacific Ocean! Since these
latter changes are known to be due to variations in fluid pressure, he postulates
a similar mechanism to account for the changes in balloon size. The analogy
here is between the Pacific Ocean and a hypothetical "sea of air," but for Schoen
the crucial feature of the analogy, the one on which its effectiveness depends,
is that "that very same property" (p. 70), fluid pressure, whose operation is
already understood in the first case, can be postulated also of the other. The
same theory can thus be employed in the two cases to understand variations in
size, even though they are in other respects quite dissimilar.
Schoen then introduces the "theologian," Fred, already referred to, who notices
regular patterns in his own life: his daily needs somehow always seem to be
supplied. Drawing upon an analogy with parents who care for their children,
Fred postulates an explanatory entity, God, to account for this. He already
understands the manner in which the care of parents manifests itself; it is then
simply a matter of determining whether the supposedly puzzling pattern in his
own life is of the same sort. If it is, the same "capacity for caring" can be
attributed to the new explanatory entity as to human parents, and we have an
explanation that conforms to the scientific pattern. As the analogy is extended:
religious theorists will look to persons as promising relevantly analogous
mechanisms. So, increased understanding into the nature and functioning
of God will result frequently from an increased understanding of human
personality (p. 101).
The resulting conception of God is of necessity an anthropomorphic one, but
this does not seem to trouble Schoen very much. Predicating characteristics
univocally of God and man frees the theorist, he suggests, from the "bonds"
imposed by writers like Tillich or Copleston; it enables him "to move beyond
merely symbolic or analogical talk about God" and "fixing the reference of
'God'" (p. 93). Yet his own example of parental love, the only example he
develops of a property to be univocally predicated of human parents and of God,
on the grounds of its explaining regular patterns in human lives, illustrates as
well as any example could the weakness of his case. Defenders of the traditional
view that all our talk about God is necessarily analogical would be quick to note
that there is immediate and obvious evidence that God's care for us does not
always manifest itself in the ways that a human parent's might.
There are at least two questions that Schoen must be able to answer positively
if his planned rehabilitation of religious discourse is to work. First, do observable
patterns that lend themselves to "religious" explanation in his sense actually
occur? Second, are the explanations given plausible? He has surprisingly little
to offer on the first of these. He talks in very general terms of "quiet whisperings
in the night," "the regular fortuitous arrival of needed funds," and other patterns
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that religious believers might be inclined to regard as miraculous (pp. 114-15).
"For the purposes of this study," he asserts, "it simply can be assumed that
events of this sort have occurred" (p. 112). But can it? Unless the skeptic can
be persuaded that these phenomena do occur, his argument will not even get off
the ground. It is not enough for the believer to discover significant patterns, if
the parallel with science is to be maintained.
The second question gives him even more trouble. For the parallel to work,
it is not enough for the "religious theorist" to follow a pattern of explanation
similar to that of the scientist. The quality of the explanation must be assessed
according to criteria similar to those the scientist would use (p. 122). These
include "explanatory precision," why, for example, balloons "expand and contract
at exactly the rates they do" (p. 131). It is this criterion, in particular, that allows
scientific hypotheses to be tested; one can draw inferences to as-yet untested
consequences and discover experimentally whether in fact these are verified.
The fertility of a theory (a criterion he does not mention, but one that is crucial
to theory assessment in natural science) is also linked with this.
H is hard to see anything even remotely corresponding to this in the context
of religious explanations. Schoen gives no illustrations of it. He speaks bravely
of "research programs" on the part of religious theorists, but it is never quite
clear how these programs operate. And on the fact of it it seems to run quite
counter to what we know of philosophy of religion to suppose that somewhere
there are researchers systematically testing and extending the "God hypothesis"
by drawing empirical consequences from it.
A question may very well have occurred to the reader by now: if religious
explanations are so similar to scientific ones, wouldn't the two compete? And
isn't this a "God of the gaps" situation where the plausibility of the religious
explanation is going to depend largely on whether there is already a scientific
explanation available? Schoen's way of handling this difficulty is most peculiar.
He supposes that there are two types of religious community. One of these,
the "rivalists," are disposed to believe that their religious truth claims, including
their religious explanations, can and often do enter with rivalry with scientific
claims. "Typically, this sort of "rivalist" attitude is expressed by the more conservative elements of any developed religious tradition" (p. 139). The other
group, the "non-rivalists," believe that "it is impossible for the claims and
explanations offered from a religious perspective ever to conflict with the findings
of the natural or social sciences." This view is likely to be found among "the
more liberal branches of religious traditions" (p. 139). In Schoen's eyes, this
seems to be a matter of attitude or of traditional belief; he does not weigh up
the merits of the two sides, but analyzes them separately when discussing the
issue of the plausibility of the explanations they offer.
One might suppose that he would himself be committed to the "rivalist" side,
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since his religious explanations purport to be scientific in form. It is hard to see
why such explanations should not be affected by the availability or otherwise of
an alternative scientific account. Yet Schoen appears to think that his project
can fit rivalist and non-rivalist alike. He recognizes that the "rivalist religious
believers" (p. 178) are in a much more vulnerable situation. In two of the three
contexts he touches on, significant large-scale biological evolution, patterns in
history, and such events in the life of the individual as "renewal, succor" (p.
173), he concludes that the rivalist explanations are lacking in plausibility. Only
with the last set does the rivalist have a chance, primarily because scientists are
not interested in such phenomena. Scientists:
are almost never tempted to explain those features of regular mail
delivery that are of most interest to religious devotees. Usually, they
will find nothing of theoretical concern in the timely arrival of needed
funds ... When confronted with undeniable confirmation of such patterns, their standard response amounts to nothing more than a series of
disinterested shrugs accompanied by mutterings about flukes or coincidence . . . Here at last the religious rivalist would appear to be able to
move beyond the level of initial plausibility (p. 177).
Recall that Schoen's aim had been to "salvage the respectability" of religious
discourse by showing that religious explanations can conform to scientific criteria.
It now seems that the success of his entire project hinges around explanations
proposed by the individual believer for such phenomena in his or her life as the
"regular arrival of funds" (p. 175). It is hard to take this seriously, especially
since Schoen does not even want to commit himself to claiming that such
phenomena really do occur (p. 183). Suppose they do, he says, wouldn't the
religious explanation be plausible since there is no scientific rival?
The skeptic is assuredly not going to be impressed by this. He has two
immediate responses: can such phenomena really be substantiated in the reliable
public way that science demands? And if the lack of credible scientific rivals is
due only to lack of interest on the part of scientists, this would be a "God of
the gaps" if ever there was one. Even Schoen himself hesitates in regard to these
objections. Once again, unless there are ranges of phenomena of a publicly
accessible sort to explain, Schoen has not established the desired parallel with
science.
I am not altogether sure that religious explanations of evolutionary patterns
can be quite so readily dismissed as Schoen assumes; at the very least, one would
have to talk about the likes of Whitehead and Teilhard de Chardin. But more
immediately of concern is that he asserts that in assessing the plausibility of
religious explanations, one must take into account the religious traditions from
which they spring. He then takes over from Laudan the questionable principle
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that religious traditions are to be evaluated in tenus of their problem-solving
successes. Even if the rivalist should happen to have a better explanation of
some natural social phenomenon than the scientist:
there will be little reason to accept it ... It is [the rivalist's] research
tradition that causes problems. Given the rapid progress and current
explanatory power of the social [and natural] sciences and the relative
impotence of their religious rivals, religious research traditions must be
greeted with suspicion. On the criteria used by Laudan, few show
sufficiently rapid development to merit pursuit and none are sophisticated
enough to merit acceptance. Without a strong research tradition to back
them, even the most potent rivalist explanations must be repudiated (p.
175).
At this point the destructive consequences for religion of the Schoen strategy
become much more evident. To assess the plausibility of a religious explanation
involves assessing the epistemic worth of the tradition associated with it from
which its warrant partly derives. And since we are to insist on the parallel
between science and religion, the entire "religious tradition" is to be evaluated
in tenus of its success at problem-solving' When Laudan ten years ago suggested
this criterion as a way of assessing the epistemic quality of domains other than
science, his suggestion met with much criticism. But Schoen takes it as unproblematic that Kuhn's and Laudan's views on theory-development in science can
be transposed as they stand to religion.
The consequences of this are far-reaching. He finds, not surprisingly, that no
religious tradition displays the sort of continuous progressive development of
problem-solution that the example of science had led him to look out for. What
are we to infer? That these traditions ought in consequence be rejected? Schoen
obviously would not want to say this, yet his fondness for scientific analogies
as the means of gaining epistemic credentials may not leave him any other
alternative. The criterion is, to my mind, an entirely inappropriate one in the
religious context. It has never, so far as I know, been acknowledged as a means
of evaluating religious traditions or theologies. They have developed their own
complex modes of assessment; progressi ve problem-solving is not one of them.
Finally, how about the non-rivalist account of religious explanation? He thinks
that it is "on the safest ground" (p. 185), although it is not at all clear how he
could align himself with it. Non-rivalists are in a stronger position simply because
they do not regard scientific explanations as a competitor. But isn't this a little
too easy? Why isn't it a competitor? Schoen has a "creative inspiration" to offer
the "nonrivalist religious community" (p. 145). Suppose, he says, two theorists
are trying to explain the motions of the hands of a clock by means of analogies
with other known mechanisms. One involves ropes and pulleys, the other, inter-
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locking gears. When the clock is opened, both mechanisms are found, each
separately sufficient to cause the observed motions.
Schoen calls this "explanatory overdetermination," and asks whether one or
other explanation should be rejected as unnecessary. After all, one of the
mechanisms would be enough, so why keep two? He responds that it would be
foolish, on the grounds of simplicity, to repudiate one of them:
While there may be no purely explanatory reason for keeping both,
there are certainly powerful nonexplanatory reasons for doing so. When
the back of the clock finally was opened, both operative mechanisms
were observed. So ... the coexistence of these two explanatory
accounts must be tolerated (p. 145).
In the same way, he concludes, the non-rivalist can point to certain patterns
which can be explained by invoking God's action, even though a sufficient
explanation is already available in scientific terms.
But this will not work. Either mechanism, in the abstract, could cause the
motion. But only one at any given time actually does. If we want to explain the
actual motion of the hands of the clock, we have to press further and ask which
mechanism is in fact responsible for it. The two explanatory hypotheses are
rivals here; though either (until the clock is opened) could explain the motion,
only one is correct. And opening the clock will enable us to tell which. So this
analogy will not serve to validate the non-rivalist approach to religious explanation. 2
Furthermore, each mechanism is in principle separately sufficient to account
for the motion. Would Schoen want to suggest that in the context of his example
of evolution, say, each of the two explanations is entirely sufficient of itself and
in no way requires or presupposes the other? To my mind, this would run quite
counter to the Christian understanding of God as creator, sustaining natural action
at all times. To explain in terms of God's creative action is precisely to deny
that the scientific explanation, though complete in its own order, is entirely
sufficient. The reason why the two explanations are not rivals is not because
either on its own is entirely sufficient but rather because they complement one
another, because they "explain" in quite different ways.
But this sort of difference is just what Schoen is at some pains to reject. By
assimilating the two sorts of explanations to one another, he wishes to make it
"impossible to opt for the suggestion that religious and scientific explanations
are of fundamentally different and therefore noncompetitive types" (p. 144).
This makes the non-rivalist alternative difficult to understand, let alone to defend.
And it also requires his non-rivalist to hold that "God's operative activity never
will conflict with the functioning of natural mechanisms" (p. 145). Were miracles,
in the traditional sense, to be admissible, the in-principle sufficiency of the
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scientific explanation would be undercut.
Why would anyone ever adopt a non-rivalist attitude, in Schoen's sense of
the phrase? Where the scientific explanation seems already sufficient, why should
anyone postulate a religious explanation as well? His answer to this I found
unexpected. There can be "nonexplanatory reasons," he says (p. 146). There
might be a "fragment of theological theory" (p. 182) that would support the
claim that God is a loving father, for example, and would therefore lead the
believer to prefer this explanation of a favorable pattern in a person's life to the
naturalistic one. But the reasons are much more likely to be "pragmatic" or
"existential," he remarks, and therefore non-epistemic in character:
If it could be shown that the acceptance of a nonrivalist explanation of
personal succor really would result in psychological or sociological
advantages that were unavailable to those who accepted only a
naturalistic account, then some pragmatic reason for introducing such
a properly formulated though explanatorily superfluous explanation
would have been produced (p. 181).

This is, as it happens, true by definition. But the question is: how adequate
a reason would it be? We can tum to "the findings of sociology or psychology,"
he suggests, to discover if belief in God really does confer the alleged practical
advantages (p. 181). And if it does, this may serve, apparently, as an acceptable
reason for adopting the religious (as well as the naturalistic) explanation for,
say, timely arrival of funds. But a non-epistemic reason (once again, by definition)
gives one no reason to believe that the claim in question is true, only that there
is a practical advantage attached to its acceptance. It cannot serve to make the
explanation resting on it more plausible, since plausibility is truth-related. Even
if belief in God can be shown, for example, to "result in a less alienated attitude
toward the world" (p. 181), this leaves unaffected the question of whether
involving God to explain the timely arrival of funds is epistemically warranted
or not, i.e., whether or not this is a good explanation.
Remark once again that a good explanation it must be for Schoen's original
strategy to succeed. It is ironic that a book whose original aim was to salvage
the epistemic respectability of religious discourse should in the end allow reasons
of this sort as part of its argument chain. The skeptic he had hoped to convince
will by now be convinced that religious discourse is even worse off than he had
at first believed. If this were the best that could be done, if religious explanation
in the end were to be restricted to contexts so banal, and were forced to rely on
reasons so clearly irrelevant to the truth of the matter, then the skeptic's suspicions
would in fact be fully justified.
Schoen, on the other hand, believes he has shown that religious explanations
can be given an "epistemologically impeccable formulation" (p. 207). Even if
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he has failed, he says on his final page, the reader should remember that there
may still be other ways to accredit religion as a human enterprise. But this comes
rather late. Recall what the original premises were: religious discourse is in need
of rehabilitation; the way to bring this about is to interpret it, or part of it at
least, as explanatory; and 'explanatory' must be construed along scientific lines.
The reader has not been prepared for the eventuality of failure.
University of Notre Dame

NOTES
I. Religious Explanations: A Model from the Sciences, by Edward L. Schoen. Durham: Duke
University Press, 1985. pp. xiii + 226.
2. I am assuming here that only one of the mechanisms is actually connected. If both are, then
neither can, strictly speaking, be said to explain the consequent motion. Rither mechanism on its
own would give only a partial explanation in this case, since it is their cooperation that is actually
responsible for the motion.

